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ABSTRACT
Parameter Assignment for Improved Connectivity and Security in Randomly
Deployed Wireless Sensor Networks via Hybrid Omni/Uni-Directional Antennas.
(August 2008)
Sonu Shankar, B.E., Anna University, India
Co–Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Deepa Kundur
Dr. Alexander Sprintson
Configuring a network system to operate at optimal levels of performance re-
quires a comprehensive understanding of the effects of a variety of system parameters
on crucial metrics like connectivity and resilience to network attacks. Traditionally,
omni-directional antennas have been used for communication in wireless sensor net-
works. In this thesis, a hybrid communication model is presented where-in, nodes in
a network are capable of both omni-directional and uni-directional communication.
The effect of such a model on performance in randomly deployed wireless sensor net-
works is studied, specifically looking at the effect of a variety of network parameters
on network performance.
The work in this thesis demonstrates that, when the hybrid communication model
is employed, the probability of 100% connectivity improves by almost 90% and that
of k-connectivity improves by almost 80% even at low node densities when compared
to the traditional omni-directional model. In terms of network security, it was found
that the hybrid approach improves network resilience to the collision attack by almost
85% and the cost of launching a successful network partition attack was increased by
as high as 600%. The gains in connectivity and resilience were found to improve with
increasing node densities and decreasing antenna beamwidths.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Wireless Sensor Networks, Connectivity and Security
The need for constant surveillance, especially of physical areas that are remotely lo-
cated, dangerous or just not economically feasible for the active presence of human
observers strongly motivates the use of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) that consist
of a network of tiny nodes capable of sensing, collecting and organizing data along
with communicating significant information to a central base. Sensor networks are
expected to cooperatively monitor physical and environmental parameters in a broad
set of applications that include battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, environ-
ment and habitat surveying, healthcare, home automation, border security and many
more [1] [2]. A defining characteristic that usually separates WSNs from other ad-hoc
networks is that of self-organization and unattended operation. Sensor networks are
expected to organize, sense and communicate on their own once they are deployed in
a target environment.
The most fundamental sensor network architecture consists of randomly dis-
tributed nodes in a target area. Each node is typically equipped with multiple sensors,
depending on the physical quantity that needs to be measured along with a radio fre-
quency (RF) or optical transmitter/receiver arrangement and a small microprocessor.
The power source for each node is usually a battery that has a limited life time. The
nodes sense physical activity and report significant information to a data collection
center called the sink. The sink may be in an area that is also occupied by human
beings and is in any case considered to be of higher capabilities than a member node
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2in the network in terms of energy, memory, computational power and bandwidth. It
is a trusted entity in the network. The sink is also envisioned as a mobile entity or a
mobile base station [3] that is useful in cases when nodes collect data and transmit
readings to a base station when available.
Although the areas in which sensor networks may be applied can vary sharply,
a common requirement of all applications is a high level of connectivity and inherent
procedures to secure the functioning of the network deployment [4–6]. These issues
drastically affect the performance of a sensor network deployment. To be able to
extract the most out of any investment in a network deployment, connectivity and
security must be priortized.
Connectivity is a fundamental requirement in wireless sensor and ad-hoc net-
works, representing the capability of a member node to communicate with other
nodes in the network either by direct transmission or via multi-hop relays. It im-
pacts every aspect of network performance including comprehensive monitoring, the
capability of self-organization, energy consumption, network longevity and network
capacity.
Security in the context of WSNs deals with protecting a network deployment
from common network attacks that work against the normal, expected functioning of
a network drastically affecting performance and harming the capability of a network
to collect and report data in a timely manner. A secure network has an inherent set
of procedures that provides a reasonable level of resilience against network attacks,
such that even in the presence of adversaries the network can be expected to func-
tion without any hindrance or possibility of sending distorted information to a data
collection center.
3B. Background and Motivation
1. Connectivity, Security and Deployment Costs in Today’s WSNs
A major factor that is considered while installing sensor nodes in a target environment
is the number of nodes to be deployed in order to guarantee the surveillance of the
area considered. According to the necessity of an application, it may be necessary to
have a high degree of precision for sensing physical quantities. Along with accuracy
of sensed data, the capability of a network deployment to monitor the entire target
environment is crucial in many sensor network applications.
Traditionally, each node in a sensor network is equipped with an omni-directional
antenna such that it can directly communicate with any other member node that is
within a particular radius around it. This radius is called the transmission radius of
the node. It defines the maximum transmission reach any node has and the circle of
a radius equal to the transmission radius around each node defines the transmission
range. Another member node that is within the transmission range of a particu-
lar node is termed its neighbor. Equivalently, any node can send information to a
neighbor via direct transmissions. If transmission of information between two nodes
require relays where-in other member nodes forward the senders packet, passing it on
to other member nodes to eventually reach the destination, then the path followed
is called a multi-hop path as it does not reach the intended destination with a single
direct transmission.
Sensor network nodes are usually deployed randomly and hence there is a non-
zero probability that one or more nodes in a deployment may be isolated. This
means that certain nodes will not have any other node within its transmission range
or equivalently, there exists no neighbors for this node. This also means that there is
no way for the node to send information to the data collection center or the sink.
4As nodes are usually randomly deployed in a target field, there is substantial
motivation to be able to provide higher probabilities of connectivity for the nodes
dropped. Again, depending on the application, connectivity may be defined in mul-
tiple ways. A very strict requirement is that of 100% connectivity which means that
every node in the deployment is capable of communicating with every other node in
the network via direct or multi-hop paths.
Connectivity and capability of comprehensive monitoring can be improved quite
simply by increasing the number of nodes deployed. This isn’t always the best ap-
proach as certain applications also have limitations on network cost. Increasing node
density equates to increased cost of deployment. Hence, there exists a need to increase
the level of connectivity without really increasing the number of nodes deployed, with
a reasonably minimal increase in per-node cost.
Another perspective is that of applications that have a fixed cost. It would
be interesting to look at ways in which assuming a fixed cost of deployment and
operation, high levels of connectivity could be guaranteed with higher probabilities,
possibly even by using a smaller number of nodes in the network.
There is a close relationship between connectivity and security of the network.
Secure protocols [7], at all layers of the networking stack, of course, help the cause
of improved resilience to network attacks. Improved connectivity, being a fundamen-
tal physical issue works towards member nodes in a network deployment possessing
multiple paths, independent and otherwise, between each other. This directly affects
the resilience of a network to denial of service (DoS) attacks [8] as when more paths
exist between nodes in a network, the cost of launching a successful attack would be
expected to increase. Consequently, there is also the need to study ways in which the
security of a deployment can be improved such that similar levels of resilience can be
5provided at lower node densities, again with reasonable increase in per-node cost if
modification is at the mote level.
Beyond the motivation of an improved cost-to-benefit ratio, being able to ex-
tract better performance from smaller node densities also have strong implications
in deployments that require a high level of covertness. Military applications like re-
connaissance procedures [9] and other security applications may require that only a
certain number of nodes may be deployed as a larger number might tend to compro-
mise the covertness of the intelligence mission. It is interesting to note that in such
applications there is a significant need to limit the number of nodes deployed although
there is no limitation on costs. This requirement may also exists in applications that
involve monitoring very delicate biological environments [10] where the least number
of foreign hardware and entities need to be employed for observation.
2. Omni-Directional and Uni-Directional Antennas in WSNs
An omni-direcitonal antenna radiates or receives equally well in all directions. It is
an antenna system that radiates power uniformly in one plane (say, the horizontal
plane) and has a directive pattern in a plane perpendicular to the first one. Tradi-
tionally sensor networks are modeled using motes that use omni-directional antennas
for communication.
The radiation pattern of an omni-directional antenna is shown in Fig. 1. It
is to be noted that in reality, radios produce three dimensional radiation patterns
(Specific details on antennas in [11]) but in this section only the azimuthal patterns
are presented. The radiation patterns are three-dimensional quantities involving the
variations of field or power (which is proportional to the square of the field) as a
function of the spherical coordinates [12].
6Fig. 1. Omni-Directional Antenna - Radiation Pattern
Antenna gain is the ratio of the power density of an antenna’s radiation pattern
in the direction of strongest radiation to that of a reference antenna. An isotropic
radiator, a theoretical point source of waves which exhibits the same magnitude or
properties when measured in all directions, is usually the reference antenna. Di-
rective Gain is a related term that is the measure of the intensity of an antenna’s
electromagnetic radiation in a particular direction.
In Fig. 2 a uni-directional antenna’s radiation pattern is shown. The energy
in a uni-directional antenna is focused in one direction and hence these types of
antennas are typically characterized by transmissions that reach much farther than
omni-directional antennas. The main lobe in the uni-directional antenna’s pattern
is the direction of maximum radiation (or reception, if reception is also modeled
using directional antennas). As seen in the figure there are also extra minor lobes
(side and back lobes). These lobes represent lost energy, that is energy spent on
directions away from the direction of interest, where the antenna intends to transmit.
Uni-directional antenna designers always attempt to minimize these lobes. If a field
pattern is described in the three-dimensional spherical coordinate system, then the
7Fig. 2. Uni-Directional Antenna - Radiation Pattern
pattern will have its main lobe or direction of maximum radiation in the z direction,
where θ = 0. The minor lobes, will be in other directions.
Any field pattern that is represented in the three-dimensional spherical coordi-
nate system can also be presented by plane cuts through the main lobe axis [12]. Two
cuts at right angles, the principal plane patterns are possible in the xz and the yz
planes. For uni-directional antenna patterns, as the pattern is symmetrical around
the z axis, one cut is sufficient to describe the pattern. Such a pattern is shown in
Fig. 2.
The beamwidth of a uni-directional antenna is a measure of its directivity which
is the width of the main lobe measured in degrees. Beamwidth is usually measured
between the -3 dB points, the points on the main lobe where the signal strength drops
8Fig. 3. Radiation Pattern Approximations
by -3 dB (one-half) from the point of maximum signal intensity. This is also called
the half-power beamwidth.
It may also be noted that the omni-directional and uni-directional radiation
patterns are approximated as circles and sectors corresponding to the largest regular
shape that the actual radiation pattern of such antennas can enclose. This can be seen
in Fig. 3 where the dotted lines represent the approximated pattern, which is a circle
in the case of an omni-directional antenna and a sector in the case of a uni-directional
antenna.
P = C.pir2 (1.1)
P = C ′.
αr′2
2
(1.2)
From [13], the energy required by a sensor node to reach all neighboring nodes
within its transmission range is proportional to the area covered by it’s radiation
pattern and is given in Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2) where r is the omni-directional antenna
transmission radius, r′ is the uni-directional range in the direction of peak gain, α
is the antenna beamwidth, P is the transmission power drawn at each antenna and
C and C ′ are appropriate constants. In Eq. (1.2) the sidelobes and backlobes are
considered to be negligible and the power is radiated entirely through the primary
main lobe.
9To compare the capabilities of uni-directional and omni-directional antennas, the
case where the area covered by the respective antenna’s radiation pattern is the same
for each type of antenna is considered. The assumption of using a constant area
in both antenna modes is justified from the knowledge of the drawn power being
proportional to the area covered by the radiation patterns. Then, the ratio k = r′/r
quantifies the additional reach possible by a uni-directional antenna over its omni-
directional counterpart and this improvement depends on the uni-directional antenna
beamwidth.
k = r′/r =
√
2pi
α
≥ 1 (1.3)
Eq. (1.3) shows that a uni-directional antenna with a narrower beamwidth will be
able to transmit signals that reach a longer distance, i.e. the narrower the beamwidth,
the higher the antenna gain. The above equations also assume that the antennas
involved have 100% efficiency, meaning that all the power delivered to the antenna
circuit is radiated during transmission, the power fed being effectively converted into
radiated power.
Fig. 4 compares the perfect radiation patterns of uni-directional and omni-
directional antennas. It is to be noted that although it may appear that a very
narrow antenna beam would have phenomenal effects on increasing antenna gain
there are practical limitations in extending transmission range using this approach.
Sensor networks have very strict requirements on form factor and size of motes. The
antenna size needs to be equivalent to the wavelength λ of operation [14] for power
efficient operation. Antenna systems that need arrays of elements also require that
they be placed at set distances apart, for example λ
2
. The unlicensed bands that are
usually used for the operation of sensor networks works at 2.4 Ghz [15]. This brings
10
Fig. 4. Uni-Directional Antennas vs. Omni-Directional Antennas
up limitations on the number of antenna elements that may be used in an array if
there are constraints in the size of a sensor mote. Thus, antenna beamwidths of pi
3
through pi
6
are common although achieving even narrower beams is expensive and
usually avoided in sensor mote design.
3. Graph Theory Basics
As the analysis on connectivity and security presented in this work will strongly use
concepts from graph theory, some basics are presented first [16].
An ad hoc network can be represented as an undirected graph G. A graph
G = G(V,E) consists of a set of n nodes or vertices and a set of m node pairs or edges.
V = {1, . . . , n}, is the set of vertices that actually represents the motes deployed in
the WSN; and the set of edges, denoted by E, represent the communication links
between these sensor motes. As the assumptions in this work include that of a
symmetric channel and as every member node is assumed to have similar capabilities,
a network can be modeled as an undirected graph.
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A neighbor of a node is any node that has a direct link or an edge with the
node being considered. The degree of a node x, denoted as d(x), is the number of
neighbors of node x. A node of degree d = 0 is called an isolated node. Such nodes
have no neighbors.
The minimum node degree of a graph G is denoted as
dmin(G) = min∀ u∈G
d(u) (1.4)
A graph is connected, if for every pair of nodes there exists a path, consisting of
one or more edges, connecting them. The graph is deemed disconnected otherwise.
This relates to WSNs as in typical deployments there might be cases when many
islands of nodes that are disconnected from a larger connected chunk exist. For a
truly connected network, all nodes in the deployment must be able to communicate
with each either via direct or multi-hop communication.
There is also the metric of k-connectivity that is very significant to WSN de-
ployments. A graph has k-connectivity, where k = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . .} if for every pair
of nodes there exists at least k disjoint and mutually independent paths connecting
them. Another similar definition is that for any graph if after disabling any (k − 1)
links the graph remains connected then that graph is k-connected. This is equivalent
to the case when if after the failure of any (k− 1) nodes, the graph is still guaranteed
to be connected, then that graph is k-connected.
The connectivity κ for a graph is the maximum value of k for which a connected
graph is k-connected. It can be intuitively agreed that κ would be the smallest number
of nodes, the failure of which would deem the network disconnected.
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C. Problem Formulation and Thesis Contributions
This thesis aims to provide useful network deployment information for randomly de-
ployed WSNs using a non-traditional communication model that can improve both
connectivity and security when compared to omni-directional antenna based networks.
Specifically, to be able to provide helpful suggestions to an agency or individual
planning on mass sensor network deployments in cases when there are many crucial
parameters that need to be carefully chosen. Poor choice of crucial network parame-
ters could cause a catastrophic increase in the cost of deployment and operation and
more importantly could drastically affect the error-free functioning of the deployment.
The primary problem this thesis deals with is parameter assignment for a new
communication paradigm that can possibly be standardized for sensor networks over a
wide range of applications by providing significant results in the realms of connectivity
and security even at lower node densities. This communication paradigm is one that
should work in tandem with any existing WSN protocol at the link layer, network
layer or beyond. The model must be able to extend the physical capabilities of a
sensor mote without drastically increasing the operating power. The improvements
in physical capabilities must not reduce the battery life of a sensor mote with the new
model when compared with a traditional mote using omni-directional communication.
Another requirement is that of not markedly increasing the complexity of operation in
terms of computational needs based on protocol changes at different layers in order to
support the communication model. The legacy of sensor networks and the ability for
mass deployment largely relies on low costs of production, deployment and operation.
This assumption will stay and drives all design changes.
Parameters including node density, transmission radius and (for the case of net-
works that involve uni-directional antennas) antenna beamwidth have a very strong
13
influence on network performance. For any communication model there is a need to
comprehensively understand the effect of varying these parameters on common met-
rics of performance. The work in this thesis aims to provide insights on the effects
of these parameters on metrics relating to connectivity including the probability of
100% connectivity, probability of k-connectivity and average number of disjoint paths
available for all randomly deployed nodes in a sensor network.
In the area of sensor network security, the work in this thesis is intended to show
that using the non-traditional communication model described will result in improved
resilience towards Denial-of-Service attacks at lower layers and also network partition
attacks. There is a need to reduce the probability of successful attacks and at the
same time increasing the cost of launching attacks on a sensor network deployment,
without drastic increases in computational complexity and operation costs.
A common theme that is of interest to the work in this thesis is studying the
capability of a sensor network deployment to perform up to required standards even
at lower node densities and transmission radii. For reasons mentioned in Section 1
operation at low node densities is very desirable for a wide range of applications.
Extracting very desirable results from settings that include low node density, low
protocol overhead and computational complexity along with negligible increase in
operating costs is a requirement that can be mapped to satisfy many sensor network
applications.
Specifically, this thesis addresses the issues outlined above by:
• Justifying the hybrid communication model and assumptions made for practical
network deployment scenarios.
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• Providing connectivity analysis resulting in improved 100% connectivity in
low density network deployments in comparison to traditional omni-directional
WSNs.
• Providing k-connectivity analysis resulting in improved average disjoint paths in
low density network deployments in comparison to traditional omni-directional
WSNs.
• Providing network security analysis for the DoS Collision Attack resulting in
improved resilience to such an attack in the hybrid communication model in
comparison to traditional omni-directional WSNs.
• Providing network security analysis for the Network Partition Attack resulting
in improved resilience to such an attack in the hybrid communication model in
comparison to traditional omni-directional WSNs.
• Empirically investigating the behavior of parameter values transmission radius,
node density and antenna beamwidth with respect to their influence on connec-
tivity and security.
• Conducting a feasibility study of the implementation, costs and protocol mod-
ifications involved for the use of the hybrid communication model.
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CHAPTER II
THE HYBRID COMMUNICATION PARADIGM
A. The Hybrid Approach
The communication paradigm that is envisioned to be employed in this thesis to meet
the demands of the problem formulated previously is termed the Hybrid Omni/Uni
Approach. The approach utilizes the insights gained from the study of antenna gains
in uni-directional and omni-directional antennas that were described in Section 2.
1. Node Details
Each sensor node in this approach is capable of both omni-directional and sector-
ized uni-directional communications. Depending on the antenna beamwidth α used,
the number of sectors Ns varies. The node is capable of transmitting in Ns non-
overlapping sectors where the antenna beamwidth α has an angle span 2pi
Ns
radians.
The node is capable of transmitting to a maximum range r′ defined by Eq. 1.3 in
each sector when compared with an omni-directional antenna of transmission radius
r. Nodes are also capable of transmitting omni-directionally at a radius r. Reception
at each node is modeled to be omni-directional.
According to the relationship in Eq. 1.3, nodes modeled using a hybrid approach
as presented in this work are designed to consume the same power per transmission
when compared with a traditional omni-directional antenna equipped sensor mote.
Thus, in terms of battery life and system longevity, node following this communication
model would see very similar performance to those adhering to an omni-directional
model.
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Fig. 5. The Hybrid Approach
Fig. 5 shows a node following the approach mentioned. A perfect radiation
pattern is shown such that in each sector the node has an extra transmission reach
of r′ − r.
Table I. Transmission Range Comparisons for Omni-Directional and Hybrid Motes -
Low r
r r′pi
3
r′pi
4
r′pi
6
0.05 0.122474 0.141421 0.173205
0.10 0.244949 0.282843 0.346410
0.15 0.367423 0.424264 0.519615
0.20 0.489898 0.565685 0.692820
0.25 0.612372 0.707107 0.866025
0.30 0.734847 0.848528 1.039231
Table I compares the normalized transmission range of motes with omni-directional
capability and those equipped with hybrid capable antennas. This table specifically
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Fig. 6. Source to Sink Traffic in WSNs
lists the comparison for lower values of transmission radii, in contrast to the area of
interest where the motes will be deployed.
Table II. Transmission Range Comparisons for Omni-Directional and Hybrid Motes -
High r
r r′pi
3
r′pi
4
r′pi
6
0.35 0.857321 0.989949 1.212436
0.40 0.979796 1.131371 1.385641
0.45 1.102270 1.272792 1.558846
0.50 1.224745 1.414124 1.732051
0.55 1.347219 1.555635 1.905256
0.60 1.469694 1.697056 2.078461
Table II tabulates the comparison of the transmission ranges for high transmis-
sion radius configurations.
2. Transmission and Traffic Modes
Fig. 6 graphically describes the most common traffic model seen in sensor networks.
The typical case is that of a network of sensor motes, called the member nodes gath-
ering information about the target environment and sending significant information
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to a, usually, centrally located sink. This traffic model is called a Source-To-Sink
model. With such assumptions, the primary requirement for setting up paths at each
node would involve computing paths towards the sink. It is to be noted that in appli-
cations that require collaboration between nodes, it is often needed to be able to send
data to other member nodes, which would be equivalent to a point-to-point, ad-hoc
traffic model. Certain applications [17] demand the collaboration of sensor motes to
collectively work towards confirming an event and sending appropriate information to
the sink. In this work, the issue of connectivity is looked at considering both models.
Although, when security is considered, only the safeguarding of source-to-sink paths
is looked at. The ability of member nodes to report sensed activity to the sink is
a fundamental requirement in a sensor network deployment and hence receives the
highest priority in terms of network security.
Traditionally, sensor networks could require both unicast and broadcast capa-
bilities depending on the needs of an application. Unicast traffic is defined as traffic
being sent to a single destination. Broadcast, on the other hand theoretically requires
sending data to all devices or nodes in a network. At the node level, these definitions
reduce to the classification of link layer transmissions. WSNs typically need to send
sensed data to a centrally located sink and so usually have a neighbor that is the next-
hop on a path towards the sink to which all data will be sent. This represents the
unicast traffic at the node considered. Collaboration and requirements from routing
protocols for example [18] would mean that nodes might have to send out occasional
broadcasts to all of its neighbors for the desired functioning of the deployment. This
would mean that each node must, at a minimum, have support for both unicast and
broadcast traffic.
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3. Omni-Directional Tx and Rx
In keeping with the requirements of reduced complexity, costs and computational
capabilities, the model envisioned in this thesis also includes omni-directional trans-
mission in-order to reduce the cost involved in broadcasts. Without omni-directional
capability, the cost of a broadcast would incur more power and delay. In terms of
the number of transmissions, it would take Ns transmissions and hence the total time
required for the broadcast to be complete would also be proportional to Ns. In the
hybrid approach, that would only be an upper bound as with a non-zero probabil-
ity, we might only need a single omni-directional transmission or an omni-directional
transmission along with a few uni-directional transmissions to complete a broadcast.
Thus for reasons of cost and reduced complexity, nodes are capable of either
unicast transmission in one of the Ns sectors in the uni-directional mode or broad-
cast communication in the omni-directional mode. For similar reasons each node is
modeled with omni-directional reception. The computational requirements involved
with supporting a protocol that can synchronize and schedule nodes for directional
reception is assumed to be prohibitive in terms of the needs of a sensor network being
able to support cost-effective mass deployment.
Another motivation for retaining the omni-directional transmission in each of
the hybrid-equipped nodes is the possibility of applying this work in the area of
free space optical (FSO) sensor networks. Milner et al in [19] promote the use of
directional optical sensors along with RF circuitry. The hybrid approach presented
in this work analyses the possibility of using all sectors for communication along with
omni-directional transmission and hence could be applied in the case when technology
is available in the FSO area to be able to transmit in all sectors. The omni-directional
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transmission would help in situations when line-of-sight (LoS) is lost and optical
communication fails.
4. Network Model
The network model that is assumed in this work is described in this section. Node
deployment is considered to be random and following a uniform distribution. Nodes
are also static and no form of mobility is assumed. The node deployment is assumed
to be within a unit square with a centrally located sink at (0.5, 0.5). As the primary
interest in the area of smaller node densities and transmission radii, node densities
in the set [10, 100] and transmission radii in the set [0.05, 0.45] are of particular
importance. The channel is assumed to be symmetric such that if node x can reach
node y through signal transmission then node y can also reach node x.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Related Work
The related work in the area of work that is of interest to this thesis can be divided
into three categories. The first category is related to parameter assignment problems
in traditional sensor and ad-hoc networks that are primarily theoretical in nature.
The second category emphasizes on improvements via routing protocols, link layer
protocols and topology control that provide insights on the use uni-directional anten-
nas in sensor networks. The last category of related work deals with the use of such
ideas in specific applications.
1. Parameter Assignment and Theoretical Studies on Connectivity
There is a tremendous amount of work in the area of connectivity in WSNs moti-
vated by a variety of ideas originating from many different areas of networking and
communication systems research [20–25]. The earliest work in the area of parameter
assignment with regards to connectivity was in the ’70s and the ’80s. A large bulk of
this work [26–28] concentrates on generating a magic number for the nearest neigh-
bors at each node to be able guarantee connectivity and at the same time maximize
capacity. The authors in [29] point out in a later publication that such a magic num-
ber does not really exist and for any deployment, as long as the target area is large
enough it is easy to prove that the network is almost surely disconnected. Such a
conclusion is extended in the more recent [30] with the result that each node in a
deployment should be connected to Θ(log n) nearest neighbors if the entire network
is to be connected in a multi-hop setting.
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The authors in [31] derive the critical transmission range of nodes placed ran-
domly in a disc of unit area, so that the resulting network is connected with a
probability of one as the number of nodes tends to infinity. The work in [32] consid-
ers an omni-directional communication model and includes results for the minimum
node degree and connectivity with an emphasis on the importance of metrics like
node density on those results. They also generate significant results in the realms of
k-connectivity and the probability of node isolation.
The body of related work mentioned in this section is relevant to the work pre-
sented in this thesis as it motivates the study of connectivity and emphasizes on
parameters like node density and transmission radius which is crucial while consider-
ing issues in this area. The work is also relevant because it motivates the fundamental
approach used in this work, which is that of maximizing the transmission range phys-
ically possible for a given level of power consumption. The publications mentioned
in this section helped identify the basic issues that could be dealt with in order to
produce desirable results in the areas of connectivity and security.
2. Routing, Link Layer Protocols and Topology Control
Authors in [33] suggest the use of directional antennas in the context of routing in
mobile ad-hoc networks when receiving nodes temporarily move out of the transmis-
sion range of a transmitting node. The work emphasizes on using the extended reach
that is available via directional antennas to be put to use when necessary in situa-
tions like the network links being temporarily disconnected owing to the mobility of
communicating nodes.
In [34] the improvements in the area of security achieved by using directional
links. Most common network attacks on sensor network deployments [7] assume the
use of bi-directional links. The authors in [34] discuss a secure routing protocol in the
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context of free space optical (FSO) sensor networks that use directional links with a
stronger resilience towards common attacks, promoting the use of directional links.
The use of directional antennas in [35] is focused towards motivating the use
of an energy efficient routing protocol. The work primarily looks at energy gains
achieved from reduced interference using directional antennas. Unfortunately, the
directional receive model used in this work increases the per-node cost. The lack
of omni-directional capability could potentially also increases the per-node latency
drastically. The cost of synchronization and coordination would be prohibitive for
mass deployment.
There is significant work in [36] that looks at interference improvements that
again comes via the use of directional antennas. The authors specifically look at
the gains achieved in throughput and capacity by modeling transmission and recep-
tion using directional antennas. The analytical conclusion is that the throughput
increases as the number of interfering neighbors decreases owing to the decrease in
the interference area.
The body of work cited in this section goes further to motivate the use of di-
rectional antennas and specifically the gains in the areas of interference inhibition
that is achieved from using them. The gains that are received from using directional
antennas only motivate further the use of a new communication paradigm that will
be proven to have superior performance in comparison with traditional approaches in
the areas of connectivity and security in this thesis.
3. Application Specific Work
The use of directional antennas and beam steering techniques are investigated in
Mobisteer [37]. The focus of the authors is to improve performance of 802.11 links
in the context of vehicular ad-hoc networks, specifically to improve communication
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between automobiles and roadside infrastructure, through the use of directional an-
tennas. A practical approach to implement beam steering is presented in the context
of vehicular networks.
Analysis of the wormhole attack in sensor networks is done in [38]. The authors
use directional antenna information to share sector information about neighboring
nodes to identify adversary nodes masquerading as false neighbors. Wormhole end-
points are blacklisted via the directional information that is shared between neighbors.
The use of directional antennas for improved security largely increases the probability
of detecting the wormhole attack.
The hybrid work mentioned in [19] has been cited earlier. The authors motivate
the use of omni-directional RF communication along with the use of a uni-directional
FSO transceiver. The RF communication is enabled in cases when LoS is unavailable.
The communication model considered in this work uses directional communication,
activated in one sector that is randomly oriented based on deployment.
The body of work cited in this section motivates the use of directional for specific
applications in the realms of sensor and ad-hoc networks. The work presented in
this thesis uses a communication model that has not been studied in terms of the
improvements that are possible in the areas of connectivity and security. The work in
this thesis that deals with parameter assignment for node density, transmission radius,
uni-directional antenna beamwidth for improved connectivity along with the details
of attack configurations that can be defended against via the hybrid communication
paradigm is not available in any existing work. This work is also unique as there
is a strong emphasis on improving performance at lower node densities without an
undesirable increase in operating costs and computational complexity.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS1
A. Justification of Node Communication Model
To be able to perform analysis and simulation studying the improvements obtained
from using a communication model as described in this work, analytical justification
for the same is necessary. In this section, it is analytically proven that the assumptions
used for the communication model employed are justified. This is done to be able to
support the use of such a model for all further analysis and simulation work.
Lemma 1 The minor lobes, represented by the side lobes and the back lobes in a
uni-directional antenna’s radiation pattern may be considered to be negligible, in
comparison to the magnitudes of primary major lobes, for practical analysis while
considering such antennas for a WSN application.
Proof
The analysis presented in this section strongly follows results in [39]. To demon-
strate using a simple example pattern, the radiation pattern graphically described in
Fig. 2 is assumed to be achieved using an array of N antenna elements that have
uniform amplitude and spacing. Let β be the progressive phase lead in the elements,
which represents the phase which the current in each element leads the current of the
previous element. d is the antenna spacing.
Thus, a uniform array, with identical elements of identical magnitude and each
with a progressive phase is considered for the proof. The total field can then be
1Parts of this section are reprinted with permission from“Towards improved con-
nectivity with hybrid uni/omni-directional antennas in wireless sensor networks” by
S. Shankar and D. Kundur, IEEE INFOCOM Student Workshop April 2008.
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formed by multiplying the array factor of the isotropic sources by the field of a single
element. The field in the elevation plane when φ = 0 is considered below. So the
pattern becomes a function of θ.
The arrray factor is given by,
AF = 1 + e+j(kdcosθ+β) + e+j2(kdcosθ+β)e+j3(kdcosθ+β) + . . .+ e+j(N−1)(kdcosθ+β)
=
N∑
n=1
e+j(n−1)(kdcosθ+β)
(4.1)
Eq. (4.1) can re-written as,
AF =
N∑
n=1
e+j(n−1)ψ where ψ = kdcosθ + β (4.2)
It can be seen that the total array factor for the considered uniform array is a
summation of exponentials and this can be represented by the vector sum ofN phasors
each of unit amplitude and progressive phase ψ relative to the previous element. The
above expression can be further simplified as shown below.
Multiplying both sides of Eq. (4.2) by ejψ,
(AF )ejψ = ejψ + ej2ψ + ej3ψ + . . .+ ejNψ (4.3)
Substracting Eq.( 4.2) from Eq.( 4.3) the expression reduces to,
AF (ejψ − 1) = (−1 + ejNψ) (4.4)
which can be further written as,
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AF =
ejNψ − 1
ejψ − 1
= ej[(N−1)/2]ψ
[
sin(N
2
ψ)
sin(1
2
ψ)
] (4.5)
When the reference point considered is the physical center of the array, Eq.( 4.5)
becomes,
AF =
[
sin(N
2
ψ)
sin(1
2
ψ)
]
(4.6)
For small values of ψ, and also to normalize the values of the array factors to
unity, the following may be done,
AF =
[
sin(N
2
ψ)
sin(1
2
ψ)
]
'
[
sin(N
2
ψ)
ψ
2
] (4.7)
AF =
1
N
[
sin(N
2
ψ)
ψ
2
]
'
[
sin(N
2
ψ)
N
2
ψ
] (4.8)
Thus, the equation for the array factor that will be used in this proof is
AF =
[
sin(N
2
ψ)
N
2
ψ
]
(4.9)
The interest of this analysis is to show that the minor lobes in the radiation
pattern of a uni-directional antenna is negligible enough to be able to assume a
pattern that can be put to great use in a WSN setting. As the equation represents a
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normalized pattern, the maximum amplitude of the main lobe is unity. The maxima
of the first secondary minor lobe occurs when,
N
2
ψ =
N
2
(kdcosθ + β) '
(
3pi
2
)
(4.10)
Using the value for θs which represents the orientation of the minor lobe and
substituting in Eq.( 4.9), the magnitude of the maximum of the first minor lobe is
computed as 2
3pi
. In dB, this is equal to -13.46 dB.
This proves that the side lobes and back lobes representing the minor lobes in a
uni-directional antenna may be ignored for common analysis. Also, according to the
array, spacing and individual magnitudes of antenna elements, even more negligible
patterns may be produced. For complete and accurate expressions refer [39].
B. Connectivity Improvements via the Hybrid Approach
In this section, analysis and simulation results for improved connectivity in WSNs
that employ the hybrid approach is presented. The connectivity issues studied can
be broadly classified into two, viz. 100% Connectivity and k-connectivity.
1. 100% Connectivity - 1-Dimensional Analysis
100% connectivity is a very stringent requirement on WSNs, although it gives very
strong insights on the improvements possible with the communication paradigm mo-
tivated in this work. 100% connectivity is defined as the case when every node in a
network deployment is capable of communicating with every other node in the network
either via direct transmissions or multi-hop paths. The fundamental communication
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model employed has a very strong influence on the connectivity of randomly deployed
sensor motes.
A linear network of sensor nodes is considered first, before moving to results
for nodes randomly deployed in a 2-dimensional plane. Analysis on linear networks
provides very useful insights that usually extends to 2-dimensional analysis. A similar
approach is employed in [24].
Lemma 2 Let r be the transmission radius of a sensor node with an omni-directional
antenna and r′ be the maximum transmission range in the direction of peak gain for
a sensor node with a uni-directional antenna. di is the inter-node distance between
nodes i and i− 1 in the linear network. Let Pr{max{di} > x} be the probability that
the maximum inter-node distance in the network is greater than x.
Then, Pr{max{di} > r} ≥ Pr{max{di} > r′}
Proof Consider a linear network where N nodes are distributed randomly over a
line. The distribution of these sensor nodes conform to a Binomial process with
a parameter p (0 < p < 1). It is assumed that the inter-node distances conform
to a series of independently and identically distributed geometric random variable
{di} with a parameter p. As consistently mentioned in this work, in the case of the
omni-directional antenna the transmission radius is r and that in the case of the
uni-directional antenna, the transmission range in the direction of peak gain is r′.
The relationship between the two is as defined in Eq. (1.3). The network is deemed
disconnected if the inter-node distance di between any pair of nodes is greater than the
transmission radius of the antenna. If the inter-node distance between all neighboring
nodes in the linear network is less than the transmission range of the antenna, then the
linear network is 100% connected. This probability of the network being disconnected
is systematically calculated below.
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The probability distribution of the maximum inter-node distance X =
max{d1, d2, . . . , dN−1} is characterized as follows.
Pr{X ≤ x} = Pr{max{d1, d2, . . . , dN−1} ≤ x}
= Pr{d1 ≤ x, d2 ≤ x, . . . , dN−1 ≤ x}
=
N−1∏
i=1
Pr{di ≤ x}
= [1− (1− p)x]N−1
(4.11)
Now, the probability that the network is disconnected with the antenna having
a transmission range r can be calculated as
Pr{max{di} > r} = 1− Pr{max{di} ≤ r}
= 1− [1− (1− p)r]N−1
(4.12)
Also from, Eq. (1.3) it can be deduced that the reach of the uni-directional
antenna will always be greater than the omni case when a uni-directional beamwidth
α ≤ 2pi is selected, which is the typical case.
r′

> r if 0 < α < 2pi,
= r if α = 2pi.
(4.13)
From Eq. (4.12) and Eq. (4.13) it can be concluded that
Pr{max{di} > r}

> Pr{max{di} > r′} if 0 < α < 2pi,
= Pr{max{di} > r′} if α = 2pi.
(4.14)
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Thus, in general,
Pr{max{di} > r} ≥ Pr{max{di} > r′} (4.15)
The simulation set up for the following results is a linear network of nodes that are
randomly distributed over a unit line. The interest of the simulation is in computing
the probability of 100% network connectivity, which means that there is no inter-
node distance in the randomly generated linear network that is greater than the
transmission radius of the antenna . If tr is the transmission range, which is r for omni-
directional and r′ for hybrid, then the linear network is disconnected if the inter-node
distance between any pair of nodes is greater than tr. The probability defined above
is compared for motes deployed with omni-directional and hybrid capable antennas.
1000 random topologies were generated to be able to compute the probability.
It is to be noted that when the omni-directional transmission radius is r, the
uni-directional case will have a radius that conforms to Eq. (1.3). To understand
the relationship with node density and transmission radius, r was varied between 0.1
and 1.0 and n, the node density, between 10 and 100. Plots comparing the omni-
directional only setting with a hybrid-capable network equipped with uni-directional
antennas of beamwidth pi/4 are shown below.
It is evident from the plots in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 that in the regions for transmission
radii between 0.1 and 0.2 the omni-directional configuration is inferior to that of the
hybrid model by almost 75%. It is to be noted that these radii settings are the more
practical settings in comparison with the length of the line which is considered here,
which is unity. For the simulation setup, the omni-directional configuration was able
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Fig. 7. Linear Network, 100% Connectivity - α = pi/4, r ranges from 0.1 to 1.0, n is
constant at 10
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Fig. 8. Linear Network, 100% Connectivity - α = pi/4, n ranges from 10 to 100, r is
constant at 0.1
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to reach a probability of 1 only when the transmission radius was increased to almost
0.6.
For the study of varying node density, it is very motivating to notice that for
node densities of 10 and 20, the improvements achieved from using the hybrid model
almost reaches 90%. The improvement is very strongly evident until node densities
of 50 and 60. It isn’t until the node density is increased to around 90 and 100 that
the omni-directional configuration actually matches the performance achieved from
using a hybrid model.
2. 100% Connectivity - 2-Dimensional Analysis
a. Omni-Directional vs. Hybrid
For the 2-dimensional case, the analytical model and results assume a set of n network
nods where n is any natural number. The nodes are independently and randomly
distributed over a region A. A uniform distribution is employed so that a constant
node density ρ = n
A
can be defined. The node density is a representation of the
average number of nodes per unit area. For example, if A was considered to be a unit
square then, ρ = n.
A wireless sensor network is represented as an undirected graph G = G(V,E)
where V represents the set of member nodes in the network and E is the set of edges
between nodes that are able to communicate with each other. Undirected graphs
are assumed because a unit disk model is assumed for communication, where the
existence of a link between any two nodes u and v in the network is dependent on
the euclidean distance between them. If ‖ u− v ‖≤ r, then according to this model
both u and v are capable of sending and receiving information from each other. r is
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the transmission radius of the omni-directional antenna in the network nodes. r′ is
the transmission range of nodes that are capable of hybrid communication.
Theorem 1 Let PHY B(dmin > 0) be the probability that the minimum node degree is
greater than 0 for a WSN with hybrid-enabled motes and POMNI(dmin > 0) be that in
the case of a WSN with omni-directional antennas.
Then,
PHY B(dmin > 0) ≥ POMNI(dmin > 0)
Proof
An upper bound can be computed for 100% connectivity by considering the
minimum node degree of the graph that is used to represent the network. The upper
bound is basically the probability that every node in the graph is connected to at
least one other node, which means that the minimum node degree needs to be 1. In
other words, the minimum node degree needs to be non-zero.
Thus,
P (G has 100% Connectivity) ≤ P (dmin > 0) (4.16)
It follows from [32] and [40] that for a network model as is described above the
probability mentioned in Eq. (4.16) can computed as
POMNI(dmin > 0) = (1− e−ρpir2)n (4.17)
In Eq. (4.17), ρ is the node density and r is the transmission range for the antenna
under consideration. Also, let PHY B(dmin > 0) be the above probability for a network
graph with each node capable of hybrid communication and POMNI(dmin > 0) be that
if each node is only capable of omni-directional communication.
Then, from Eq. (1.3) and Eq. (4.13) it can be directly concluded that
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PHY B(dmin > 0) ≥ POMNI(dmin > 0)
The simulation set up is intended to provide better insights into the relationship
between connectivity, beamwidth, node density and transmission radius. The 2-D
model for the results shown below is a randomly distributed network of nodes in a
unit square. The probability of 100% network connectivity, which guarantees that
every pair of nodes can communicate with each other is computed. 1000 random
topologies were generated to be able to compute the probability. To understand the
relationship with node density and transmission radius empirically, the normalized
r was varied between 0 and 0.5 and n, the node density, between 10 and 100. The
effects of varying the beamwidth is demonstrated by three configurations, pi/6, pi/4
and pi/3.
From the plots in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, it is evident that along the lines of the
results from the 1-dimensional case, the hybrid communication model out performs
a strictly omni-directional model by phenomenal margins.
In the plot that details the probability of 100% connectivity with varying trans-
mission radius it can be noticed that the omni-directional case only hits a non-zero
value around a setting for r around 0.3. On the other hand, the hybrid setting at a
beamwidth setting of pi/6 has performance at r = 0.1 that is almost equivalent to that
of the omni-directional case at r = 0.35. The difference is less than 2%. It is evident
from the probability plot at r = 0.3 that the hybrid configuration out performs its
omni-directional counterpart by more than 90%. This is very crucial information for
WSNs that require limited transmission radius or operation power.
As seen in the plot over the lower transmission radius range, the difference in
performance for various antenna beamwidth settings in the hybrid case is sharper at
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Fig. 9. 2-D Deployment, 100% Connectivity - α = pi/3, pi/4, pi/6, r ranges from 0.1 to
1.0, n is constant at 10
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Fig. 10. 2-D Deployment, 100% Connectivity - α = pi/3, pi/4, pi/6, n ranges from 10 to
100, r is constant at 0.2
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lower transmission radius settings. The benefits of using a very narrow beamwidth
hybrid configuration evidently decreases with increasing transmission radii. This
is rather intuitive considering n being constant at 10 for the plot in Fig. 9. The
number of neighbors possible for each node would only marginally increase at higher
transmission radii owing to such a sparse node deployment.
The ratio between r and r′ is obtained by substituting for α as required in
Eq. (1.3). As can be seen in Table I and Table II, there is a larger difference in
the transmission range of varying beamwidths with increasing r. This will be more
evident in the case of the varying n plot in Fig. 10.
In Fig. 10, r is set to a constant of 0.2 and the study of the effect of varying
node density is done. It can be noticed that with increasing node densities, all com-
munication models move towards a very high probability (close to unity) of 100%
connectivity. Again, this is rather intuitive as with increasing node density, the aver-
age distance between any two nodes in the deployment reduces thus making it easier
to achieve better connectivity with low transmission radii. In terms of improvements
via the hybrid approach, it is interesting to note that at very low node densities
of 10, 20 and 30, the least expensive hybrid configuration of pi/3 out performs the
traditional omni-directional approach by between 80 and 90%.
It is rather interesting to note that the hybrid configurations stay at a consistent
probability of unity from a node density as low as 30. The omni-directional case on
the other hand climbs slowly to around 88% only at a node density of 100. This
suggests that there might be other gains that the hybrid approach brings beyond the
node density setting of 30. These effects in terms of k-connectivity and the availability
of multiple disjoint and independent paths will be studied in a later section.
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Fig. 11. Uni-directional Network with constant n 100
b. Uni-Directional WSNs
To elaborate on the degree of improvements obtained from a hybrid approach, in this
section simulation results on connectivity for WSNs that have sensor motes that are
equipped only with uni-directional antennas for communication are presented.
The simulation setup for the following results are exactly similar to the previous
section. The only difference being that each mote is capable of uni-directional com-
munication in one sector only. There will be a constant antenna beamwidth for all
the deployed motes, although the orientation of each mote will be random. The rela-
tionships between the normalized transmission radii for r and r′ remain as described
in Table I and Table II.
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Fig. 12. Uni-directional Network with constant n 10
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Fig. 13. Uni-directional Network with constant r 0.2
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It is interesting to note that in the direction of the work presented in this thesis,
the concentration and emphasis on low node densities and transmission radii would
mean that a uni-directional WSN would require very large node densities to be able
to generate non-zero probabilities of 100% connectivity. For this reason, the plots in
Fig. 11 - Fig. 13 use the metric Percentage Connected, which represents the largest
connected subset of nodes from the entire deployment as a percentage. For example,
if from a deployment of 10 nodes, via uni-directional WSNs the largest connected
component has say, 4 nodes, then the percentage is 40%.
From Fig. 11, it can be noticed that for a strictly uni-directional WSN with a
constant node density n at 10, the largest connected subset of nodes varies between
a little over 10% at a transmission radius r of 0.05. For the same set of transmission
radii, but an increased constant node density of n set to 100, it can be seen that
the largest set percentage improved drastically to vary between close to 50% at a
transmission radius of 0.1 to more than 70% that is consistent from a transmission
radius of 0.2 on.
Finally, Fig. 13 presents the rather linear improvement of the metric considered
with increasing node densities and a constant transmission radius of 0.2. In keeping
with the theme of the work presented in this thesis, only results from low node
densities have been described.
3. k-Connectivity and Disjoint Path Analysis
In this section, analysis and simulation describe the performance of the hybrid ap-
proach as a communication model in WSNs in the area of k-connectivity and availabil-
ity of disjoint paths. The graph theoretic definitions for k-connectivity were briefly
described previously.
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From the perspective of a communication network and WSNs, there is interest in
providing multiple disjoint, mutually independent paths for each node to communicate
with the sink or data collection center. The simulation results presented in this section
do not consider the existence of multiple paths between all pairs of nodes, but only
between each node and a centrally located sink. The motivation for such an approach
is the typical traffic model for WSNs being source-to-sink as described earlier.
The network model for the results presented in this section are exactly similar
to that in Section a.
The interest of the following analysis is to prove that the hybrid communication
model which involves using sensor motes capable of omni-directional and sectorized
uni-directional transmission is capable of superior performance when compared to a
network using motes that only have omni-directional capability.
Lemma 3 For a random undirected graph of n nodes if edges are added to the empty
graph in an order chosen randomly and uniformly from the
(
n
2
)
! possibilities, then
almost surely the graph that results from the edge additions becomes k-connected when
it achieves a minimum degree of k. For large n,
Prob(G is k-connected) = Prob(dmin ≥ k) (4.18)
where dmin is the minimum degree (defined in previous sections) per node.
The above has been proved for random graphs in [41] and [40] for graphs with
pathloss models.
For the interest of this thesis in WSNs with low node densities, an upper bound
for a probability of k-connectivity is computable by considering the probability that
the minimum degree of each node in the network graph is greater than or equal to
k. In topological terms, this is equivalent to every node in the network having nneigh
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neighbors such that nneigh ≥ k. Thus, the probability of dmin ≥ k would give the
upper bound that is needed.
Results for the same exist in [32] in the context of wireless multi-hop networks
with nodes capable of omni-directional communication. Following the nearest neigh-
bor methods approach employed in that work and using standard graph theoretical
results the upper bound can be computed.
Theorem 2 If PHY B(dmin ≥ k) if the probability of the average minimum degree
being greater than k for a network with hybrid-enabled motes and POMNI(dmin ≥ k)
was that for an omni-directional network then,
PHY B(dmin ≥ k) ≥ POMNI(dmin ≥ k)
Proof
The minimum degree probability as a function of node density and transmission
radius is known from [32].
POMNI(dmin ≥ k) =
(
1−
k−1∑
N=0
(npir2)N
N !
· e−npir2
)n
(4.19)
Here ρ = n, since by definition ρ = n
A
but in this case A = 1.
The approximation for computing the required bounds for k-connectivity via
computing the probability for a minimum degree requirement on each node is ex-
pressed below.
P (G is k-connected) ≤ P (dmin ≥ k) (4.20)
As justified earlier, the use of the hybrid approach enables activation of all sectors,
thus extending the reach of the sensor mote along all directions. While analytically
evaluating this approach, the capability of all sectors to be activated depending on
uni-cast traffic awaiting transmission helps extend Eq. (4.19) by substituting for the
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transmission radius r with r′ in accordance with the relationship in Eq. (1.3). In
the following equations, the minimum degree probability in the omni-directional is
denoted by POMNI(dmin ≥ k) and in the hybrid case as PHY B(dmin ≥ k). Eq. (4.19)
can now be re-written as,
PHY B(dmin ≥ k) =
(
1−
k−1∑
N=0
(npir′2)N
N !
· e−npir′2
)n
(4.21)
Using Eq. (1.3) substituting r′ as r
√
2pi
α
so that
PHY B(dmin ≥ k) =
(
1−
k−1∑
N=0
(npi 2pi
α
r2)N
N !
· e−npi 2piα r2
)n
=
(
1−
k−1∑
N=0
(2npi
2r2
α
)N
N !
· e−2npi
2r2
α
)n
=
(
1−
k−1∑
N=0
(2npi2r2)N
αNN !
· e−2npi
2r2
α
)n
(4.22)
From Eq. (1.3), Eq. (4.13) and with the expansion in Eq. (4.22) it can be con-
cluded that,
PHY B(dmin ≥ k) ≥ POMNI(dmin ≥ k) (4.23)
The hybrid case is equivalent to the omni-directional case when hypothetically,
a beamwidth setting of 2pi is used. For all other settings, the hybrid case will thus
have a higher probability of disjoint paths in the network deployment.
The simulations below explicitly support this claim. The nodes are assumed to be
static, with uniform random distribution and capable of both omni-directional and
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directional communications. Directional communications is modeled via sectorized
uni-directional antennas, dividing the entire omni-directional region of 2pi radians
into a number of sectors according to the antenna beamwidth. Each sector can be
activated, one at a time so that at any instant the node may appear to be equivalent
to a uni-directional antenna and that reception is omni-directional. In the omni-
directional mode, each node is capable of transmitting at a radius r. When switched
to the uni-directional mode, each node is capable of transmitting at a radius r′ related
to r by Eq. (1.3), in each sector.
The results shown below are based on a randomly distributed network of nodes
in a unit square. There is a centrally located sink at coordinates (0.5, 0.5). The
interest of these simulations is in studying the effect of node density, transmission
radii and uni-directional antenna beamwidth on the k-connectivity of a randomly
deployed network of sensor nodes. The attempt begins by computing the probability
of 2-connectivity, or the probability that every node in the network deployment will
have at least 2 disjoint mutually independent paths to the centrally located sink. 1000
random topologies were generated to be able to compute the probability. Mutually
independent paths are computed using standard disjoint path algorithms, using min-
cut/max-flow techniques and link reversals that provide optimal sets of disjoint paths
as mentioned in [42] and [43]. To understand the relationship with node density
and transmission radius empirically, the normalized r was varied between 0.05 and
0.45 and n, the node density, between 10 and 100. This is basically the probability
of 2-connectivity. The effects of varying the beamwidth from pi/6 to pi/3 was also
demonstrated by appropriate configurations for the simulations. These plots are
shown below.
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 describe the probability of 2-connectivity over varying trans-
mission radii, node density and antenna beamwidth.
48
Fig. 14. Probability of Existence of Two Mutually Disjoint Paths for All Nodes in the
Network- Varying Transmission Radius r
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Fig. 15. Probability of Existence of Two Mutually Disjoint Paths for All Nodes in the
Network- Varying Node Density n
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It can be seen from the first plot with a constant n and varying r that again,
the hybrid approach provides a very substantial non-zero probability even between
the lower transmission radii settings of 0.15 and 0.25. At a setting of 0.25, the
hybrid approach out performs the omni-directional setting by almost 40%. When the
operational transmission radius is set to a high 0.4, the improvement is almost around
80% as can be seen.
The second plot in Fig. 15 describes the effect of varying node density n for a
constant r of 0.2. Intuitively with increasing node density, the omni-directional set-
ting is able to climb to higher probabilities, as seen for the maximum node density of
100 that is considered for these simulations, the probability for an omni-directional
configuration reaches around 0.7. In contrast, the hybrid approach was at a prob-
ability of more than 0.7 around a node density of just 40. This emphasizes on the
improved performance available when the hybrid approach is employed even at lower
node densities. At the interim node density of 50, the hybrid approach out performs
an omni-directional only setting by more than 90%.
To further demonstrate the improvements in terms of the availability of disjoint
paths for each node, another set of simulations are presented that use the metric
Average Number of Disjoint Paths for the Network. This metric represents the average
number of paths all member nodes in the network deployment possesses towards the
centrally located sink.
Results for varying n and r are presented in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17. For the first
plot, a very low node density of n = 10 was considered. 10 nodes distributed over a
unit square, is usually a very sparse deployment even for a normalized radius of say,
0.2 for an omni-directional configuration. Interestingly enough, the hybrid setting
with r at 0.2, meaning that for α = pi/6, r′ is around 0.69, the average number of
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Fig. 16. Average Number of Mutually Disjoint Paths for All Nodes in the Network -
Varying Transmission Radius r
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Fig. 17. Average Number of Mutually Disjoint Paths for All Nodes in the Network -
Varying Node Density n
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disjoint paths was around 7. For the omni-directional setting, the network was able
to even reach 1-connectivity.
For varying n, there is an almost linear relationship in terms of the incremental
gains achievable from using the hybrid approach. At the maximum setting of node
density 100, the hybrid approach provides around 17, 25 and 40 disjoint paths on an
average for the network at the beamwidth settings of pi/3, pi/4 and pi/6 respectively.
The omni-directional setting even at the maximum node density of 100 could barely
make an average value of around 3 mutually independent paths.
C. Security Improvements via the Hybrid Approach
Network security is often as important as performance depending on the constraints
under which the elements of the network are expected to function in a desirable
manner. Securing a sensor network is very crucial to maintain the purpose of an
installation, ensuring the capability of member nodes to report activity without any
hindrance and disallowing non-member entities from obtaining sensed data.
In most critical environments, security of a deployed network is of utmost im-
portance. A network is most secure when its member nodes cannot be compromised,
messages exchanged cannot be deciphered by non-member nodes and the none of the
links can be disabled by an adversary, even for a short duration of time. Network
availability and reliability are frequent targets for adversaries who intend to deem the
deployment incapable according to the requirements of the attack.
A variety of routing attacks on wireless sensor attacks are mentioned in [6]. An
interesting area of sensor networks and communication networks in general is securing
the deployment from Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [8]. Consideration of security
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issues during the design stage of sensor network protocols is necessary to keep the
networks from being vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Yet another attack [6] [8] that is of interest to WSNs is the Network Partition
attack. The approach towards both of the above-mentioned attacks are similar in
that the adversary is interested in disabling links and nodes, eventually contributing
to the success of the respective attacks.
In this section, analysis and simulation results are presented to prove the im-
proved resilience of the hybrid approach against these attacks.
1. Concentrated Collision/DoS Attacks in WSNs
a. Introduction
A DoS attack is an attempt by an adversary or group of attacking adversaries to
disable normal communications in a network by making resources unavailable to el-
ements in the network. DoS attacks against sensor networks are usually the most
crippling and are also the most complicated to devise countermeasures against to im-
prove resilience. The interesting nature of such attacks is that an ongoing attack often
goes undetected as the misbehavior perceived at each node is very subtle and could
be misinterpreted by the unsuspecting member node as being caused by network and
environmental conditions like poor link quality and traffic congestion.
In the context of WSNs, a specific type of DoS attack involves attacks based on
collisions and interference at the transmission medium. This is sometimes referred
to as a MAC Collision Attack, referring to the Medium Access Control layer in the
network protocol stack or also the Link-layer Collision Attack.
The link-layer collision attack involves an adversary inducing a collision (even
over one octet of a transmission) by broadcasting junk data to disrupt packets being
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transmitted over a channel. An attack of this kind is most effective in networks using
cooperative scheduling schemes relying on carrier sense at the link layer, which are
essentially contention based transmission scheduling schemes.
The effect of a collision attack on a network deployment is two-fold. Firstly,
as the adversary only needs to cause collisions for a short duration to damage an
entire frame, errors in reception increase at receiving nodes. Error correcting codes
have been previously suggested as a countermeasure, although its use is usually more
suitable for errors caused due to the time-varying characteristics of wireless channels,
where there an upper bound on the variation in channel quality can be guaranteed.
Attacking adversaries will intend to work towards corrupting more data than the
network can correct [8]. Secondly, a naive MAC layer would repeatedly attempt
retransmission ultimately leading to the exhaustion of battery resources at a node,
leading to drastic effects on network connectivity.
In this section the benefits of using a hybrid communication model and more
specifically the gains are analyzed by considering the metric of the Probability of
Successful Attack.
b. Network Model
Network model considered is identical to previous sections. Node deployment is con-
sidered to be random and following a uniform distribution. Nodes are also static and
no form of mobility is assumed. The node deployment is assumed to be within a unit
square with a centrally located sink at (0.5, 0.5). The channel is assumed to be sym-
metric such that if node x can reach node y through signal transmission then node y
can also reach node x. Each node is capable of either omni-directional communication
with a range r or of hybrid communication with a range r′. The relationship between
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Fig. 18. Network Deployment Example
Fig. 19. Network Attack Scenario - Concentrated Collision Attack
r and r′ is as described in Eq. (1.3). n member nodes are randomly and uniformly
distributed over the unit square.
Fig. 18 shows an example of such a network deployment. This deployment may
be considered as enclosed in a unit square.
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c. Threat Model
The attacking adversary launches a covert attack on a WSN deployment by occas-
sionally broadcasting junk data that causes collisions at the MAC layer for protocol-
abiding sensor nodes. The collisions induce Layer 2 retransmissions and subsequent
malicious broadcasts will work towards draining out a member nodes battery and the
eventual disconnection of the network.
An adversary needs to only be active for a small ratio of the total transmission du-
ration for a link layer frame to get corrupted such that it will invoke a retransmission
from the layers below. It is to be noted that even without the potential draining out
of a member node such attacks cause considerable damage to the normal functioning
of a network.
The specific attack of interest to the work in thesis is graphically described in
Fig. 19 where an adversary is interested in disabling communication for a subset of
the original n nodes deployed. This is a very crucial attack as the adversaries are
interested in performing activity in a small region that is part of the unit square
which is the environment of interest.
As seen in Fig. 19, the attacking adversary nodes are deployed in a smaller region,
which is assumed to be a square of side d such that 0 < d < 1. A total of m such
malicious nodes will be deployed in the smaller region, the Zone of Attacker Interest.
The intention of the adversary nodes is to disable the capability of nodes within the
interest zone to report sensed information to a centrally located sink. Each of the
adversary nodes is capable of omni-directional transmission with a maximum range
of r.
In Fig. 20, the effect of the adversaries are seen in terms of the disabled links
within the attacker’s zone of interest. Any link that is entirely within the transmission
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Fig. 20. Network Connectivity Post-Attack
range of any of the m attacking adversaries is disabled. Intuitively, the larger the
number of adversaries inside the zone of interest, there will be more links disabled.
The zone of interest of the attacker is assumed to a remote area away from the
sink. Attacking a network near the sink would compromise the covertness of the
attack and hence lead to early detection. Therefore, the attacked area is assumed to
be a smaller square that will not include the sink.
d. Metric of Comparison
The metric of comparison that will be used is the Probability of Successful Attack.
The adversary is modeled as using m attacking malicious nodes and these nodes will
be deployed in a square of side d as described earlier. The attack is deemed successful
if all original member nodes within the small square, in the zone of interest have all
their paths towards the sink broken.
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e. Attack Analysis
Mathematical analysis and simulation results are now presented to prove the improved
resilience against such an attack by using the hybrid communication model.
Theorem 3 If a WSN deployment, where n member nodes are randomly and uni-
formly distributed inside a unit square. Each of the n nodes has a transmission range
r0, where r0 can be r or r
′ depending on the communication model chosen, omni-
directional or hybrid respectively. Let |Aattack| be a randomly chosen square with side
d such that 0 < d < 1. Let m attacking adversary nodes be deployed randomly and
uniformly inside |Aattack| such that each malicious node has a transmission range r.
The adversaries intend to damage the network within |Aattack| with a collision attack.
Then,
The success of the attack is dependent on n, m, r0 and d and it is decreasing in
n, d, r0 and increasing in m.
Proof
Let G(V,E) be a geometric undirected random graph that is k-connected. This
means that there exists at least k mutually independent disjoint paths between every
pair of member nodes say u and v.
n member nodes are randomly and uniformly distributed in a unit square, form-
ing the network deployment. A square of dimensions d× d is randomly placed in the
unit square. d is such that,
0 < d < 1 (4.24)
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The smaller square is denoted as |Aattack|, which is the Zone of Interest for the
adversary. |Aattack| represents the area of interest for the attacker. m adversary nodes
are deployed randomly and uniformly in |Aattack|, such that,
1 < m < n (4.25)
Each of these m nodes are programmed to induce interference over a disk of
radius r, which is the omni-directional transmission range. Any link between two
nodes that are within the interfering region of any of the m adversary nodes will
be disabled owing to the continuous broadcast of junk data by the adversary nodes.
This means that either node on the edge could be within the transmission ranges
of different adversary nodes. The entire length of the edge need not be within the
adversary’s range of transmission. It is assumed that,
r  d (4.26)
As the n original member nodes were deployed randomly and uniformly in the
unit square and since the d × d square, region |Aattack| was also chosen randomly it
can be stated that with a high probability,
s =
⌊
n · d2⌋ (4.27)
s in Eq. (4.27) represents the number of original member nodes in the region
|Aattack|. It is to be noted that for a general distribution of nodes in a given area,
then the above equation would be modified so that the node density ρ would be used
instead of n.
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Each of the adversary nodes affect a disk area centered at this nodes of radius
r. The probability that one of the s nodes in |Aattack| actually falls within the trans-
mission range of the disk of radius r centered at the adversary can be computed as
below.
p =
pir2
d2
(4.28)
In Eq. (4.28), it can be seen that d2 is the area of |Aattack| and pir2 is the area of
interference for each of the adversary nodes.
It is of the interest of this section to provide an upper bound for the probability
that an attack launched with m adversary nodes is successful. The computation
of this probability can be approximated as the probability for all of the s original
member nodes that are inside the region |Aattack| to have all of their k links broken.
More specifically, in the region of the interest, the original member nodes may be
either connected or disconnected. If they are connected they have at least one path
towards the sink. Also, either all nodes have at least one path to the sink or there is
at least one node that has no path towards the sink. This gives,
P (All nodes have at least 1-connectivity) =
1− P (At least one node has no connectivity)
(4.29)
Now, by Eq. (4.20), the probability that an original member node has all k
paths to the sink broken can be approximated to the probability that this node has
k neighbors in the transmission range of an adversary node. Now the probability of
having more than k points inside the transmission range of an adversary is given by
the binomial formula ,
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γ :=
s∑
h=k
(
s
h
)
ph(1− p)s−h where s = ⌊n · d2⌋ and p = r2pi
d2
(4.30)
Eq. (4.30) represents the probability with the presence of one adversary node.
Since there are m adversary nodes and these were chosen randomly and independently
in the region |Aattack| with r  d then the probability that the original member node
inside this region is still at least 1-connected and the node remains secure becomes,
PSECURE := (1− γ)m (4.31)
Similarly, the probability that the original member node is disconnected and
hence attacked becomes,
PATTACKED := 1− (1− γ)m (4.32)
From Eq. (4.30), Eq. (4.31) and Eq. (4.32) the following equations may be de-
rived.
PSECURE =
(
k−1∑
h=0
(
s
h
)
ph(1− p)s−h
)m
where s =
⌊
n · d2⌋ and p = pir2
d2
(4.33)
PATTACKED = 1−
(
k−1∑
h=0
(
s
h
)
ph(1− p)s−h
)m
where s =
⌊
n·d2⌋ and p = pir2
d2
(4.34)
It is to be noted from the above equations that PATTACKED depends on m, d, r0
and n in a very interesting fashion. From Eq.( 4.19) and Eq.( 4.22), it can be deduced
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Fig. 21. Attack Probability for Low k
Fig. 22. Attack Probability for High k
that k is larger for larger n and r0. From Eq.( 4.34) it can be deduced that with a
larger k the attack is less successful. Thus, the attack success decreases in n and r0.
Also, in Eq. (4.34), p is dependent on d. This dependence shows that the success
of the attack decreases with increasing d. Also, PATTACKED increases with m.
Thus, the success of the attack is dependent on n, m, r0 and d and it is decreasing
in n, d r0 and increasing in m.
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The Eq. (4.34) was plotted for fixed values of n and r and setting the value of k to
low and high configurations corresponding to the difference between omni-directional
and hybrid deployments. The general trend followed by the analysis can be seen in
Fig. 21 and Fig. 22.
The simulation set up for this problem is similar to what was described in Sec. b.
n nodes are uniformly and randomly distributed over a unit square. A smaller square
|Aattack| is randomly chosen for every run with a side d. m adversary nodes are
randomly and uniformly distributed over this region, which is the attacker’s region
of interest. m is chosen as a fraction of n and is varied as n
2
, n
4
, n
8
and n
10
.
Once the network is set up and all network paths are established, the adversary
nodes are dropped. All affected links will be removed and the network paths are
established again with the updated graph. If all original member nodes within the
region |Aattack| lose all paths towards the sink, then the attack is deemed successful.
The probability of such an attack being successful is computed over 1000 random
realizations of deployments.
The plots in Figs. 23 - 26, show the probabilities of successful attacks when an
omni-directional antenna based sensor network deployment is used. It can be seen
that the primary dependence of the probability of attack success is on d and m. This
is intuitive as the smaller the region |Aattack| is, the density of the attacking adversary
nodes in that region increases. The general trend noticed is that with increasing d,
the probability of successful attack increases. When m increases, there is an increased
density of adversary nodes in the area of interest, increasing the probability of the
network being attacked again. This is also seen as a general characteristic from the
plots.
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Fig. 23. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 30, Transmission Radius - 0.2, Antenna
Setting - Omni-Directional
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Fig. 24. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 30, Transmission Radius - 0.4, Antenna
Setting - Omni-Directional
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Fig. 25. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 70, Transmission Radius - 0.2, Antenna
Setting - Omni-Directional
68
Fig. 26. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 70, Transmission Radius - 0.4, Antenna
Setting - Omni-Directional
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Fig. 27. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 30, Transmission Radius - 0.2, Antenna
Setting - Hybrid pi/6
It can be seen that on an average, for the range of parameters considered, the
attack will be most successful at a setting of d = 0.05 and m = n
2
with a probability
very close to 1. With increased node density n, the probability reduces.
In Figs. 27 - 30 the improvements with the hybrid approach are clearly visible.
It is noticed that at the worst case of d = 0.05 and m = n
2
, the hybrid model, shown
in these plots with a setting of pi/6, the probability of successful attack is reduced to
as low as just a little less than 0.15 for the case when the node density n is 30. The
effect of increased node density is understood from the simulations for the case of the
node density n set to 70. As m stays the same, increased node density for the original
member node deployment would mean that more nodes would be present inside the
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Fig. 28. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 30, Transmission Radius - 0.4, Antenna
Setting - Hybrid pi/6
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Fig. 29. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 70, Transmission Radius - 0.2, Antenna
Setting - Hybrid pi/6
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Fig. 30. DoS-Collision Attack: Node Density - 70, Transmission Radius - 0.4, Antenna
Setting - Hybrid pi/6
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smaller square or |Aattack|. When the node density is 70, the probability of attack
success at the worst case of d = 0.05 decreases to 0.05.
2. Network Partition Attacks in WSNs
a. Introduction
Network partition attacks are a class of attacks that is closely related to the previous
network attack analyzed in this thesis. In the previous section, a concentrated attack
was looked at, where the adversary is motivated to disable only a small subset of the
network deployment in order to carry out an event that must not be detected and
reported.
Sensor networks are envisioned to be able to observe an environment in great
detail. For such a requirement, it would become necessary to ensure high levels
of connectivity across the entire environment that is of an observer’s interest. As
a characteristic of the network deployment, it is also very desirable to have higher
resilience and tolerance towards network partitions and cuts.
Network partition attacks and concentrated collision attacks described in the
previous section are motivated for similar reasons. In the network partition attack,
the attacker’s primary objective is to disable communication between two subsets of
the network deployment.
b. Network Model
The network model is identical to that considered in the previous attack analysis.
There is a random and uniform deployment of n nodes in a unit square. Each of these
member nodes is capable of either omni-directional communication at a transmission
range of r or uses a hybrid model with a transmission range r′. The channel is assumed
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Fig. 31. Network Example - Before Attack
to be symmetric such that if node x can reach node y through signal transmission
then node y can also reach node x.
While considering this attack, the traffic model is considered to be ad-hoc or
point-to-point. For this reason, the existence of a sink node is not assumed at the
center of the unit square. The example of a network deployment just before the attack
is carried out is shown in Fig. 31.
c. Threat Model
For the network partition attack, the Network Cut Coefficient (NCC), represented by
 is an important parameter.
For a network deployment that contains n member nodes that is uniformly and
randomly distributed in the environment considered, the effect of  is as follows. If
a partition attack with an NCC =  is successful, then the two subsets of nodes, n.
and (1 − n). will be unable to communicate with each other. This eventually leads
to a partition in the network. It is to be noted that all nodes within either subset
may not connected to each other after the attack. A linear cut across the unit square
at y =  will result such that there is no possibility of communication across the cut.
It can be understood that  takes a value such that 0 <  < 0.5, assuming the
unit square as the region of interest to the network deployment observing physical
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Fig. 32. Network Example - During Attack
phenomena. Values beyond 0.5 are not considered owing to the assumption of uniform
distribution. Such a distribution would mean that for settings of  between 0 and 0.5,
the requirements to launch an attack would be similar for settings of 1− .
As can be seen in Fig. 32, the attacker will be assumed to consider a linear
cut in the unit square of randomly and uniformly deployed member nodes. There is
also a parameter d, which is different from the context of the previously described
attack. In the context of this attack, d is a value such that 0 < d < r0 that defines a
region, which is a rectangle, over which the attacking adversary would be deploying
malicious nodes to increase the efficacy of the attack and further contribute towards
partitioning the network.
The adversary nodes work towards disabling links within their transmission
ranges similar to the case of the previous attack. Each malicious node is capable
of omni-directional communication with a transmission radius r.
The effect of such at attack is visible in Fig. 33. All links around the  linear cut
region were disabled. In the example shown it took 8 adversary nodes distributed in
the region of attack to be able to disable communication between nodes across the 
line.
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Fig. 33. Network Example - Post Attack
The model for dropping adversary nodes is chosen in such a manner, because
in reality precise placement of adversary nodes is cumbersome from the perspective
of the attacker. The larger rectangular area is a more realistic approximation of the
model that will be followed by an attacker in real life to be able to create a partition
in such a network deployment.
d. Metric of Comparison and Analysis
The metric of comparison between omni-directional based WSNs and a hybrid net-
work is the Cost of Launching Successful Attack. This cost is measured using the
number of adversary nodes that is required to be dropped into the region covered by
the rectangular area.
Theorem 4 Let n nodes be randomly and uniformly distributed in a unit square, each
of transmission range r0. r0 can be r or r
′ depending on the communication model
employed by the member nodes. Let 0 <  < 0.5 describe a linear cut across which
a network partition is required by attacking adversary nodes. Let 0 < d < r0 define
the rectangular area of sides 2.d and 1 where the adversary nodes are randomly and
uniformly dropped. Let each adversary node have a transmission range of r.
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Then, the cost of launching a successful attack increases in n, r0 and  and
decreases in r.
Proof
The requirement for the attack to be successful is that all nodes on either side
of the linear cut defined by  must be unable to communicate with each other, across
the cut. It is known that,
0 < d < r0 (4.35)
The area of the rectangle formed by the bounds between + d and − d is given
by,
NPAttackArea = 2 · d× 1 = 2 · d (4.36)
The success of the attack may be approximated as all original member nodes
within the rectangle of area NPAttackArea losing all k neighbors that exist. If nadv
is the number of adversary nodes deployed to carry out the network partition attack,
then following the results from Eq.( 4.34), the probability can be computed as,
PPARTITION−ATTACKED = 1−
(
k−1∑
h=0
(
s
h
)
ph(1− p)s−h
)nadv
(4.37)
where s=
⌊
n ·2d
⌋
and p = pir
2
2.d
It is to be noted that the parameters s and p are modified for the model assumed
for this attack. It has been justified in Sec. 3 that k increases with r0. This implies that
the probability mentioned in Eq.( 4.37) decreases with r0 leading to the conclusion
that the cost of launching a successful attack increases in r0. Eq.( 4.37) also directly
implies that the cost increases in n and decreases in r.
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For the remainder of this analysis the fundamental motivation of the attacker,
which is disabling links that exist on either side of the line of cut is considered. As
the distribution of the member nodes is considered to random and uniform, then the
number of original member nodes on either end of the line of cut can be computed
on an average, with a very high probability as shown below.
nSubset1 =  · n (4.38)
nSubset2 = (1− ) · n (4.39)
It is understood from the above equations that as  ranges between 0 and 0.5,
for smaller values of , the number of nodes in the first subset will smaller.
nSubset1 < nSubset1 when  < 0.5 (4.40)
According to the requirement of the attack, lesser number of nodes in one of
the subsets, would mean that there will be a smaller number of links to disable for
the attack to be successful. This is so because, there will be a smaller number of
links formed across the cut with the nodes from the smaller subset. As the value of
 progresses towards 0.5, the number of nodes on either end will be comparable and
the number of links to be broken would also increase.
Thus, with increasing  the cost of launching a successful attack increases as it
would require more malicious nodes to disable the increased number of links across
the cut.
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Fig. 34. Network Partition Attack Cost - n = 30, r = 0.05
The simulation set up for the following set of results is similar to those of previous
settings. The interest of this set of simulations is to understand the loss of links across
the cut. For this reason, an ad-hoc or point-to-point traffic model is assumed and
the emphasis of the analysis is on paths between all member nodes in the network
deployment. For the interest of the work presented in this thesis, d is chosen to be
0.3 on either side of the line of cut represented by .
The cost of a successful attack is computed in terms of the number of adversary
nodes that must be deployed within the rectangle formed by the bounds between
 + d and  − d. Nodes on either side of the cut are organized into two sub-graphs.
The adversary nodes nadv are continuously deployed until no node in one sub-graph is
able to communicate with any node in the other sub-graph. Two transmission radii
settings of 0.01 and 0.05 are considered along with two settings for node density at
30 and 70.
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Fig. 35. Network Partition Attack Cost - n = 30, r = 0.1
As seen in Fig. 34 and Fig. 35 when the NCC is set to a small value of  = 0.1,
there is an almost linear increase in the cost of the attack nadv in both plots. With
the plot that describes an increase in r, it can be seen that the cost of the attack
decreases in comparison with the previous setting. This is justified by the reasoning
that each of the adversary nodes have a communication radius r. And for the range
of r chosen and the constant node density, the number of nodes that each adversary
can disable increases.
Plots in Fig. 36 and Fig. 37 show the effect of an increased node density. With
increased node density, the number of links that exist across the line of cut also
increase as a consequence of which the number of adversary nodes needed to make
the attack successful increases. The node density setting chosen for the second set of
plots is n = 70.
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Fig. 36. Network Partition Attack Cost - n = 70, r = 0.05
Fig. 37. Network Partition Attack Cost - n = 70, r = 0.1
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this work results on connectivity and security improvements using a hybrid ap-
proach towards antennas in sensor networks were presented. The results obtained are
particularly interesting at lower node densities and transmission radii, motivating the
use of a hybrid approach under these conditions for achieving better performance.
The standard communication paradigm that is currently employed in most sensor
network deployments involves using omni-directional antennas, and the work pre-
sented in this thesis proves the capability of the new hybrid communication paradigm
to out-perform the existing model in the areas of connectivity and security.
The specific information obtained from the results of this thesis in terms of the
node densities and transmission radii is useful for network designers when considering
the right network configuration required for providing certain levels of guarantees for
connectivity and security against common network attacks.
Future work would involve the study of the effect of interference from using the
hybrid communication paradigm. As transmissions are always restricted within sec-
tors, intuitively the expected result is improved capacity. Another improvement in
terms of the hybrid approach would be the use of directional reception. The im-
provements in connectivity from the use of directional reception would be interesting
to consider. In terms of improved system longevity, the use of variable transmission
and reception power is yet another technique that may be employed. The transmis-
sion power could be selected according to the distance between the transmitting and
receiving nodes.
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APPENDIX A
PROTOCOL ADDITIONS FOR NEIGHBORHOOD MANAGEMENT
In this section, a procedure that may be appended to any existing neighborhood
management protocol is briefly described. This would explain in detail how a protocol
can be modified so that it can perform the function of switching between sectors and
also switching from a sector to the omni-directional mode. This also explains when
switching is necessary. The most common and simple neighborhood discovery algo-
rithm that is employed in sensor networks involves each member node broadcasting
a HELLO message so that any neighboring node within its omni-directional reach
will be able to hear its transmission. Upon receiving such a packet, a neighboring
node will respond with a HELLO RESPONSE packet and both nodes update their
neighbor tables with the identities of each other, which is included in every transmis-
sion. A modified version of such a protocol for uni-directional sensor networks is seen
in [44]. For the hybrid approach a procedure that may be incorporated in existing
sensor network stack implementations as an interface detail between the network and
link layers is presented.
A very simple algorithm that may be used is described below:
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Algorithm 1 Hybrid Approach - Neighborhood Management Extension
1: Set Antenna Mode = OMNI
2: Run Neighborhood Discovery Procedure
3: Populate Neighborhood Table
4: Set Antenna Mode = UNI
5: for SECTOR = 1 to SECTOR = 6 do
6: Run Neighborhood Discovery Procedure
7: Populate Neighborhood Table
8: end for
Fig. 38. Neighborhood Management with Hybrid-equipped Nodes
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For each node in a network, the antenna mode is first set to omni-directional
and the HELLO message exchanges will be carried out followed by updating the
neighborhood table. The same is repeated for each available sector; 6 sectors, each of
beam width pi/3 are used as an example in the algorithm described above. In addition
to existing information, the sector and antenna mode will be stored at each node. In
Fig. 38 an example of a node updating its neighborhood table is graphically described.
As seen, the procedure begins with the omni-directional case for Node 1 and Nodes
2, 3, 4, 9 and 8 are enlisted. The shaded region shows the area over which the
message broadcast can be received by any listening node positioned accordingly. The
procedure continues with scans in Sectors I through VI and for those sectors where
neighbors are found, entries are correspondingly made. As reception is modeled as
omni-directional, the existence of a cheap compass at each node is assumed so that
responses may be sent back to Node 1 in the right sector. Another low cost but
sub-optimal approach is to send responses for node 1 in all available sectors until
an acknowledgement is received for the same. Sending sectors may be appended to
packets along with node identities for this reason. Fig. 38 also emphasizes on the
fundamental advantage of using a hybrid approach for enhanced connectivity as seen
in the shaded regions extending beyond the circle when each sector is activated.
Although the major traffic model employed for sensor networks is that of source-
to-sink, where for a static network a node senses data and typically has the same
next hop that would be used for the shortest path towards the sink, there are cases
when data may have to be sent to other neighbors. Load balancing routing protocols
and also applications that require collaboration between sensor nodes for data ag-
gregation and other purposes are some examples where ad-hoc communication might
be required. Thus, although switching sectors will not be required for a majority of
the lifetime of a node, it is still a necessity for the operation of any sensor network
93
deployment. The neighborhood management procedure described above will work in
unison with an existing stack’s routing protocol by switching sectors according to the
destination of the packet in a node’s transmit queue. Further optimization may be
envisioned in terms of grouping packets in queue according to the sectors required for
transmission based on the QoS requirements embedded into the packet.
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APPENDIX B
COSTS - IMPLEMENTATION
The cost of using the hybrid approach is now analyzed in terms of hardware
and implementation overhead. The hybrid paradigm is envisioned to be implemented
using smart antenna technology. Smart antennas are basically beamsteered arrays
where the radiation pattern is shaped according to a variety of optimum criteria [45].
Smart antennas have for many years been demonstrated to be able to support a vari-
ety of beamforming algorithms and have been used in cellular communication systems
to improve capacity and range [46]. Beamforming is a technique that utilizes signal
processing techniques to control the sensitivity and direction of antenna radiation
patterns. For this reason, smart antennas have often been alternatively called digital
beamformed (DBF) arrays. An electronically steerable linear array of antenna ele-
ments may be employed to achieve the antenna characteristics that is desired in the
RF module present on the hybrid sensor nodes. It has to be noted that a circular array
would provide improvements in terms of form factor and size. Smart antennas have
very recently been considered specifically for sensor networks as seen in [47] which
describes a smart antenna sensor mote platform. There is also significant work that
uses components available off the shelf for applications in vehicular networks [37].
As mentioned in Sec. A the excitation voltages across the array elements plays
a significant role in the radiation pattern the composite antenna produces. In terms
of cost analysis, the most important factor would be the number of antenna array
elements used. The number of elements also have a direct effect on the effective
beamwidth achievable by the antenna [48] as is seen below. An array factor of N is
considered, such that there are N + 1 antenna array elements spaced at a distance
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D(D ≤ λ/2) apart in a linear array, where λ is the operating wavelength. The
position of the nulls and maxima are directly dependent on the number of antenna
elements, the beamwidth being a function of the array factor and the effective path
loss exponent. For the effective path loss exponent, α∗ which is related to the path
loss exponent α as α∗ = α/h, the relationship between lgWB and lgN was found to
be linear [48], with a slope γ which is the beamwidth decay index and intercept b such
that,
lgWB = −γlgN + b (B.1)
This can be rewritten as,
WB = 10
b/Nγ = b1/N
γ (B.2)
Eq.( B.2) confirms the notion that with increasing number of antenna elements in
the phased array antenna, there will be more nulls, a sharper main beam and smaller
side lobes in the resultant radiation pattern, this giving narrower beamwidths.
Thus, for the hybrid approach requirement using an array of 4 antenna elements
would suffice for generating 6 sectors of beam width pi/3 each. This is further justified
via the following simplified relationship [49] [50] [51]:
ne =
λ
d.sin(α/2)
(B.3)
ne is the number of elements in the array, λ is the operating wavelength, d is the
antenna spacing and α is the beam width.
As antenna elements are typically spaced d = λ/2 apart in an array, the number
of elements can be generalized as
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ne =
2
sin(α/2)
(B.4)
Smart antennas are implemented today with digital beamformers [52] and so
switching sectors does not incur any costs in terms of power or delay. Assuming such
digital beamformers, costs may include a possible increase in the operating voltage
and unit cost as components increase in terms of the number of antennas required
for beamformimg. If we consider an omni-directional node to have a single antenna
then ne will be the additional number of antennas required. A detailed cost analysis
per mote for a highly capable sensor node is found in [53]. Although a highly capable
sensor mote is considered in this case, the intension of the following description is to
provide an estimate of the increased cost of using the hybrid approach in terms of
percentage of original cost of the mote.
Table. III follows from [53].
The antenna used in the mote described is replaced with a smart antenna, specif-
ically an ATMEL AT86RF211 as used in [47]. The module will operate in one of the
configurable modes according to the requirements of the radiation pattern desired.
This component can be purchased for a cost of 8.00 dollars. Thus the increase in
cost as a percentage of the cost of the entire sensor mote for the example considered,
Incperc will be such that Incperc ≤ 2%.
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Table III. Sensor Mote Component Costs
Function Part Cost in $
Processor Atmel AT91SAM7S256 8.70
Timing Abracon ABM8-16.000MHz-B2-T 1.50
Modem Chipcon CC2500 2.66
T/R Switch NEC UPG2214TB (2x) 0.56
PA NEC UPG2314T5N 2.00
LNA Maxim MAX2641 0.80
Antenna GigaAnt 3030A6111-01 3.00
Sensor Panasonic AMN44122 26.74
Power Supply Maxim MAX8621 3.70
Other/Misc Misc. Parts 20.00
PCB Fabrication 1 board 30.00
PCB Assembly 1 board 30.00
Packaging Case 60.00
TOTAL 257.66
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